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2 Metaphor Difficulty
Abstract Sources of Difficulty in the Yound Child's
Understanding of Metaphorical Language
Three experiments examined children's understanding of metaphorical language.
In these experiments, preschool, first grade, and third grade children heard
short stories ending with a metaphorical sentence describing an action. They
were then asked to act out the stories and the metaphorical sentences using
toys in a specially constructed "toy world." Metaphor comprehension was
assessed on the basis of the children's enactments. The experiments
manipulated the predictability of the story endings given the already
established context, and two aspects of the complexity of the metaphorical
sentences themselves: the verb of the metaphorical sentence (literal versus
nonliteral verb), and the explicitness of its comparative structure (simile
versus metaphor). Results showed that both the predictability of the story
endings and the complexity of the metaphorical sentences had a marked effect
on the difficulty of the metaphor comprehension task. The data were
interpreted as supporting the view that the success or failure in
comprehending metaphorical language depends on the overall difficulty of the
comprehension task, conceptualized in terms of the interactive effects of
different difficulty sources, rather than simply on the fact that a
linguistic input requires a metaphorical interpretation. The experiments
also identified some of the conditions under which even preschool children
show evidence of metaphor comprehension, and clarified aspects of the
development of metaphoric competence.
Existing research reveals conflicting findings about the ability of
children to understand metaphorical language. While research directly
investigating children's comprehension of metaphor tends to show that
metaphor comprehension does not occur until late childhood or early
adolescence (Asch & Nerlove, 1960; Billow, 1975; Cometa & Eson, 1978; Winner,
Rosenstiel & Gardner, 1976), there is other evidence that even preschool
children have some basic metaphoric competence. For example, Gardner (1974)
found that given a pair of adjectives (hard/soft) and a pair of sounds,
colors, or faces, 3 1/2-year-old children could sometimes match such
adjectives with an appropriate sound, color or face. Gentner (1977) also
showed that preschool children can perform analogical mappings from the
domain of the human body to pictures of mountains or trees as consistently as
adults.
Further support for the idea that young children have some basic
metaphoric competence comes from observations that preschool children are
very creative in their use of language, making sophisticated comparisons that
involve the ability to see similarity between things that, at a superficial
level, seem very dissimilar (Billow, 1981; Carlson & Anisfeld, 1969;
Chukovsky, 1968; Gardner, Winner, Bechhofer & Wolf, 1978; Piaget, 1962;
Winner, MacCarthy, & Gardner, 1980). Of course, the fact that children
produce utterances that appear metaphorical from the adult point of view,
does not establish that the children themselves are aware of the
distinction between metaphorical and literal similarity. However, in a
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recent study, Vosniadou and Ortony (1983) found that by four years of age
children are able to distinguish comparisons based on metaphorical similarity
from those based on literal similarity.
In our view, the incompatibility between claims that young children do
not understand metaphorical language and reports that they produce metaphors
or have some fundamental metaphoric competence is partly due to certain
methodological problems with the empirical research upon which some of these
claims are based. Developmental work on metaphor comprehension often suffers
from one or more of three common problems. First, failure to understand
metaphors is sometimes confounded with lack of background knowledge. For
example, the failure to correctly interpret a metaphor like "The prison guard
was a hard rock" (see Winner et al., 1976) might be the result of inadequate
knowledge about prison guards and/or about the particular personality traits
to which "hard" can be applied metaphorically (but see Winner, Wapner, Cicone
& Gardner, 1979).
Second, metaphorical utterances are often presented to children in the
absence of any reasonable linguistic or nonlinguistic context. However, in
real life children are not usually exposed to metaphors out of context.
Thus, to test metaphor comprehension in this way puts the child in an
unrealistic situation. Lack of an appropriate context can often lead to
comprehension difficulties or errors even in an adult's comprehension of
literal language, let alone in the child's understanding of metaphorical
language.
Finally, children's comprehension of metaphor is frequently measured in
terms of the quality of a paraphrase or explanation. Although the ability to
paraphrase and explain metaphors is worth investigating, paraphrase and
explanation may not be valid indices of metaphor comprehension. They require
the ability to reflect on one's comprehension and therefore impose cognitive
demands in addition to those required for comprehension alone (Brown, 1980;
Flavell, 1981). Thus, while appropriate paraphrases and explanations
certainly suggest successful comprehension, inadequate paraphrases and
explanations cannot be taken as evidence of comprehension failure.
Corroborating this last point are the results of studies not requiring
verbal explanations of metaphors. For example, Winner, Engel and Gardner
(1980) found that children do better in multiple-choice tasks than in tasks
in which they must state the grounds of the metaphor themselves. Reynolds
and Ortony (1980), using a four alternative forced choice task and the
context of a short story, found that 7-year-olds showed evidence of metaphor
comprehension. And, in the context of proverb comprehension, Honeck, Sowry
and Voegtle (1978) found that 7-year-old children could understand proverbs
when they had to match a proverb to one of two pictures--a nonliteral correct
interpretation of the proverb and a foil. Yet even tasks such as these have
their limitations: they do not give the child the opportunity to respond
spontaneously and they still impose additional cognitive demands.
We believe that the processes underlying the understanding of
metaphorical uses of language are fundamentally the same as those involved in
the comprehension of literal uses of language. Thus we see no reason, in
principle, why metaphorical language should present children with an
insurmountable comprehension problem. In both literal and metaphorical uses
of language the meaning of a linguistic input is derived rather than given.
The derivation of this meaning is achieved under the constraining influences
of the already established context and of characteristics of the input
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itself. In other words, comprehension involves the interaction between top-
down and bottom-up processes (Rumelhart, 1977). Within this general
framework, the difficulty of a comprehension task can be conceptualized in
terms of the interaction of two interrelated but independent difficulty
sources: (a) the predictability of the meaning for a linguistic input with
respect to the already established context (a predominantly top-down
component), and (b) the complexity of the linguistic input itself with
respect to its derived meaning (a predominantly bottom-up component). Both
of these factors contribute to the difficulty of the comprehension task,
presumably because of the nature and complexity of the underlying processes
involved. When the difficulty of the comprehension task (i.e, deriving a
meaning for the linguistic input) reaches some point, which we call the
difficulty limit, comprehension failures result.
This account appears to apply to both literal and metaphorical instances
of language use. However, while predictability of meaning is independent of
the literal/metaphorical distinction, the complexity of a linguistic input is
not. Other things being equal, one might expect metaphorical uses of
language to be more difficult to understand than literal uses because
additional processing is necessary to determine the referents of the terms
used metaphorically. However, this does not mean that all metaphorical
inputs need be harder to understand than any literal input. Nor does it mean
that the additional difficulty resulting from metaphorical inputs always and
necessarily results in a total level of difficulty that is close to or
exceeds the difficulty limit for young children. Therefore we are skeptical
about general claims that metaphor comprehension develops much later than the
comprehension of literal language (e.g., Cometa & Eson, 1978), and that it
follows a literal stage (e.g., Winner, et al. 1976). Rather, it appears to us
that, to a large extent, the success or failure of comprehending metaphorical
uses of language depends on the overall difficulty of the comprehension task,
conceptualized in terms of the interactive effects of different sources of
difficulty, rather than on metaphor per se.
The purpose of the present research was to investigate the young child's
understanding of metaphorical language within the theoretical framework we
have outlined. Both of the two potential sources of comprehension
difficulty, i.e. the predictability of the meaning of the linguistic input
with respect to the established context, and the complexity of the linguistic
input itself, were investigated. All three experiments manipulated
predictability by using metaphorical sentences representing more likely or
less likely outcomes of the same story. In addition, Experiments 2 and 3
examined the effects of the complexity of the linguistic input. This was
accomplished by changing the verb of the metaphorical sentences (literal vs.
nonliteral verb) and by manipulating the explicitness of their comparative
structure (simile vs. metaphor).
The present experiments used metaphorical sentences that compared items
which were expected to be relatively familiar to young children. Also, the
experimental paradigm adopted required children to act out the actions
described in the stories, including the actions implied by the metaphors.
Children did this by manipulating objects in a specially constructed "toy
world." Metaphor comprehension was measured on the basis of "enactments."
This "enactment" paradigm provides a measure of metaphor comprehension which
does not depend on metalinguistic skill or linguistic ability, and which
still leaves the child free to respond to the task in his own way. In
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addition, acting out the entire story forces children to process the story's
content, making it more likely that they will use this content to understand
the metaphor. Research (e.g. Paris & Lindauer, 1976; Markman, 1977) has
shown that children do not always engage in sufficient cognitive processing
of verbal information in experimental settings. Having children act out the
stories helps to avoid this problem.
Experiment 1
One variable with obvious potential for influencing the difficulty of
the comprehension task is the degree to which the idea expressed by a
linguistic input is predictable from some already established context. The
main purpose of this experiment was to investigate how the predictability of
the idea expressed by a metaphor (its implied meaning) meaning affects its
comprehension. Metaphors were presented in the context of a story and
differed with respect to the predictability of their implied meanings. It
was hypothesized that if predictability influences the difficulty of the
comprehension task, then better performance should result from metaphors
representing more probable story endings than from those representing less
probable endings.
Method
Subjects. Subjects were 90 children: 30 preschoolers ranging in age
from 4.0 to 4.11 years (mean age 4.5), 30 first graders, ranging in age from
6.0 to 6.11 years (mean age 6.5), and 30 third graders, ranging in age from
8.1 to 8.11 years (mean age 8.7). The children attended a nursery school or
an elementary school in a rural town in Illinois. In each group
approximately half of the children were girls and half were boys.
Design and materials. The design was a 3 (Grade: P vs. 1 vs. 3) x 2
(Predictability Level: more probable vs. less probable) factorial design with
between subject measures on both factors. In addition there were two control
groups, a literal-ending group, and a no-ending group. There were eight
subjects in each group with the exception of the literal control group which
had six subjects.
The task consisted of listening to seven short stories (a practice story
and six experimental ones) and acting them out with toys. For the
experimental group all stories ended with a metaphorical concluding sentence
which described a story outcome and which also had to be acted out with toys.
Comprehension was assessed on the basis of the children's enactments of the
metaphorical concluding sentences.
Two types of concluding sentences were constructed for each story. They
differed with respect to the likelihood of the story outcomes they described,
given the story content. Those describing actions which represented
relatively likely outcomes of the stories will be referred to as more
probable. Those describing actions which represented relatively less likely
story outcomes given the story's content will be referred to as less
probable. The degree to which the actions described by the concluding
sentences represented more or less probable story outcomes was operationally
defined in terms of the likelihood that children would enact the ending
described by the concluding sentence given only the preceding context
information. These likelihoods were originally determined in a pilot study,
and in this experiment were confirmed on the basis of the enactments of the
no-ending control group.
Metaphor Difficulty
10 Metaphor Difficulty
The no-ending control group was run concurrently with the experimental
group at each age level. The children in this group heard the stories
without a concluding sentence and were asked to act out their own endings.
Of the endings provided, 55% were the same as the actions described by the
more probable concluding sentences while only 27% matched the actions
described by the less probable concluding sentences. The remaining 18% of
the endings did not agree with either one of the existing concluding
sentences.
The literal-ending control group was included to ensure that children
were able to understand and act out the particular story endings when
expressed in literal language and thus to exclude the possibility that
failure to correctly enact the metaphors was caused by factors unrelated to
the experimental manipulation. In the literal control group the concluding
sentences were "translations" of the metaphors in the sense that they induced
similar enactments to those induced by a correct interpretation of the
metaphors. The literal concluding sentences had the same syntactic form as
the metaphorical concluding sentences. All concluding sentences appear in
Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here.
The stories varied in length from 90 to 110 words and described
situations familiar to, or easily imaginable by young children. The
following is an example of one of the stories together with its various
endings:
Billy invited some of his friends to his house, so his mother baked some
cookies. She told Billy not to eat the cookies before his friends arrived
and she sent him to his room to play. Then she put the cookies in the
cupboard and went out to the back yard. After his mother left, Billy came
down. He opened the cupboard and found the cookies. He was ready to eat the
first cookie when he heard his mother coming back in.
More Probable Concluding Sentences
Metaphorical: "Billy was a squirrel burying the nuts."
Literal: "Billy was a child hiding the cookies."
Less Probable Concluding Sentences
Metaphorical: "Billy was a squirrel heading for his tree."
Literal: "Billy was a child running to his room."
The children acted out the stories with toy figures which were set up on
a 4' x 5' rectangular board. Seven miniature buildings were placed on the
long sides of the board, and one center piece was placed in the center of the
board, facing the child.
----~--- ~~- ~----~~--~--------------------
Insert Photographs 1, 2, 3 and 4 about here.
~~~-~-------~--~~~----~--------------------
The seven side buildings were the same in all stories and represented a
constant environment in which the children enacted the stories. They are
shown in photograph 1. The buildings were made of wood, were roughly to
scale, and on average were about 10 inches high. They were painted by an
artist in a realistic way. As shown in the photographs, the side buildings
represented (starting from the right) a hospital, a school, a toy store, a
church, two houses, and a McDonald's restaurant. There were four different
center pieces. One depicted a park with a playground (photograph 2),
another, the interior of a house (photograph 3), a third piece represented a
football field (photograph 4) (used as a practice item), and finally one
represented a circus.
Procedure. Each child was tested individually by two experimenters.
Testing took place in a quiet room in the school and lasted from 35 to 40
minutes. Children were randomly assigned to the experimental group or to one
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of the control groups. Each child was first asked to identify the various
buildings. In the few cases in which a building could not be identified, the
building was named by the experimenter. The child was then instructed to
listen carefully to the stories and to act them out with the available toys.
Children in the experimental group were told to pay particular attention to
the ending of each story "because the story's ending will not say exactly
what happens." They were instructed to use the toys to act out what they
thought the ending of the story meant. Children in the no-ending control
group were asked to act out their own endings to the stories. For all
groups, one story was used as a practice item and was always read first. No
specific feedback was provided, and, in particular, the children were never
told what a correct enactment of a concluding sentence was like. The order
of presentation of the other stories was random for each child.
One of the experimenters read the stories, stopping at prearranged
positions to give the child time to act out the described actions. If the
child could not act out the concluding sentence, the instructions were
repeated and the sentence was reread. If this did not help, the experimenter
proceeded to the next story. When all the stories were read, the
experimenter asked the children in the experimental condition to justify
their enactments of the concluding metaphorical sentences of the last three
stories. The children were asked to try to explain what the metaphors meant.
The second experimenter recorded all the enactments on a map that
corresponded to the story, and noted all relevant verbalizations. All
sessions were audio taped and two children in each group were video taped.
Scoring. Upon examining the children's responses it became apparent
that one story with its corresponding metaphorical sentences was particularly
difficult for all children to enact. This was because, for both the more
probable and less probable endings, the nature of the physical set up made
the intended metaphorical interpretation either too unlikely or
inappropriate. For example, one of the endings required a small figure to
"bully" a much larger figure. Children were reluctant to act this out under
any circumstances. The data from this story were discarded, reducing the
number of stories analyzed from six to five. Responses on the first
(practice) story were not scored.
The children's enactments in the metaphorical-ending groups were coded
by two independent judges. The few cases (2%) of disagreement were easily
resolved after brief discussion. The following four categories of enactments
were employed:
(1) Unrelated enactments covered cases in which a child performed an action
apparently unrelated to that implied by the metaphor. If, for example, given'
the sentence Billy was a squirrel burying the nuts, a child made Billy's
mother spank Billy, the response would be coded as an unrelated enactment.
Those instances in which a child failed to respond to the metaphors at all
were also placed in this category.
(2) Literal enactments covered cases in which a child tried to enact the
metaphors literally. If, for example, given the sentence Billy was a
squirrel burying the nuts, a child pretended that Billy was a squirrel and
that he was burying some pretend nuts outside his house or in the floor of
the kitchen, the response would be coded as literal.
(3) Composite enactments, which fell between literal and correct enactments
(to follow), were the cases in which a child acted out the implied meanings
of the metaphors partly literally and partly correctly. Again, if, given the
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sentence Billy was a squirrel burying the nuts, a child made Billy try to
bury the cookies in the kitchen floor like a squirrel, it would be coded as a
composite enactment. In this example a child would have correctly
interpreted nuts to refer to the cookies, but would have tried to enact
burying literally.
(4) Correct enactments were those in which an action clearly corresponded to
the implied meaning of the metaphors. Thus, if given the sentence Billy was
a squirrel burying the nuts, a child made Billy hide the cookies either back
in the cupboard or somewhere else, the response was coded as correct.
The children's enactments in the literal-ending control group were also
examined. Each response was marked as correct if it represented an accurate
enactment of the actions described in the literal concluding sentence.
Results
Results from the literal control group revealed that the children had no
problem understanding the stories or enacting the endings when these endings
were stated literally. The mean proportion of correct enactments was 1.00
for all age levels with the more probable endings. With the less probable
endings this proportion was 1.00 for the third grade children, and 0.93 for
the preschool and first grade children. Thus, the predictability of the
concluding sentence, given the preceding context, seemed not to have affected
the enactments in any significant way. This was not the case for the
metaphorical concluding sentences.
Table 2 shows the mean proportion of responses in each of the four
enactment categories for the more probable and less probable metaphorical
concluding sentences in the three age groups. As the last column shows, the
mean proportion of correct enactments was high for all age groups in the case
of the more probable metaphors, but it decreased dramatically, especially for
the younger children, in the case of the less probable metaphors. This
decrease was accompanied by an increase in all other enactment categories
with the exception of literal enactments which disappear in the third grade
group.
--------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here.
--------------------------
It should be mentioned here that the data were quite consistent across
children. For example, given the more probable concluding metaphors, only
one of the 24 children in the three age groups scored less than four out of
five correct. In the less probable condition, only one preschooler (out of
eight) produced more than two correct enactments, only one first grader
produced more than three, while only one third grader produced less than
three.
A 3 (Grade) x 2 (Predictability Level) analysis of variance was
performed on the proportion of correct enactments to the stories containing
metaphors. The unrelated, literal, and composite enactments were not
included in this or in any of the other analyses reported in this or
subsequent experiments. Also, because all ANOVA's were performed on
proportional data having a binomial rather than a normal distribution, an
angular or inverse sine transformation was applied in all cases. The Grade
by Predictability level analysis showed main effects for Grade, F(2,42) =
6.49, < .01, and for Predictability Level, F(1,42) = 62.27, y < .001.
Although an inspection of Table 2 would lead one to expect a significant
interaction between grade and predictability (and analyses using the
untransformed data confirmed this expectation), the grade by predictability
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interaction was not significant with the transformed data ( F < 1).
In order to determine whether the performance of the experimental group
exceeded the performance of the no-ending control group, two additional
analyses were performed. First, the enactments in the no-ending control
group which agreed with the actions implied by the more probable metaphors
were compared to the correct enactments of these metaphors in a 3 (Grade) x 2
(Group : Metaphor vs. Control) analysis of variance. The analysis showed a
main effect for Group, F(1,42) = 28.93, p < .001. The upper graph of Figure
1 presents the mean proportion of correct responses in the two groups. It
shows that the children could all easily enact the implied meaning of the
metaphors representing the more probable story endings, and that they did so
much more often than did children in the no-ending control group.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Then, the enactments in the no-ending control group which agreed with
the action implied by the less probable metaphors were compared to the
correct enactments of these metaphors in another 3 (Grade) x 2 (Group)
analysis of variance. This analysis showed a main effect for Group, F(1,42)
= 6.10, p < .01, a main effect for Grade, F(2,42) = 6.50, p < .01, and a
Grade x Group interaction, F(2,42) = 3.14, p < .05. The mean proportions of
correct enactments in these two groups appear in the lower graph of Figure 1.
As can be seen, there was no difference between the experimental and no-
ending control group in the case of the preschool children. First and third
grade children, however, did better in the experimental group than the no-
ending control group.
Examination of the verbal protocols revealed, as expected, that the
older children provided better and more complete explanations of the
metaphors than did the younger children. It was not until third grade that
children began to systematically provide explanations that related the two
domains analogically (e.g., "It meant like a squirrel is frightened when
somebody gets near them and I thought it meant him darting up the stairs and
going to bed so that his mom wouldn't know that he was in the kitchen trying
to get the cookies"). Of the children who gave literal responses
(preschoolers and first graders), most explained them mainly in terms of
"pretend" actions. That is, Billy was not a real squirrel but he pretended
to be one, he acted like a squirrel by running fast on four legs, digging,
and burying the cookies. There were few "magical" types of responses such as
those discussed by Winner et al. (1976).
Discussion
The results of this experiment suggest that under certain circumstances
even preschoolers show evidence of understanding metaphorical language. This
in itself is a new finding. It seems that children can and do draw inferences
from the information provided by the linguistic and situational context in
which the metaphor occurs--inferences which help them understand the
metaphor's implied meaning. The decrease in the performance of, especially,
the younger children on the metaphors that represented less probable story
endings also indicates that the context in which the metaphorical language
occurs is an important variable in metaphor comprehension.
It might be argued that the younger children did not really understand
the more probable metaphors that they enacted correctly, but that they simply
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acted out the actions invited by the linguistic and situational context.
This argument is not, however, supported by the data. The fact that the more
probable metaphor group performed significantly better than the no-ending
control group shows that the presence of the metaphorical sentences
contributed to the number of correct enactments over and above the
contribution of the context. Still, all the children, and particularly the
younger ones, found it difficult to use the meaning conveyed by the metaphor
to revise their original hypotheses based on contextual information alone.
This is shown by their low performance with the less probable metaphors. It
seems that difficulties arose for these children not from the presence of
metaphorical language per se, nor from the unpredictability of the ending per
se, but from the conjunction of the two. This conclusion follows (a) from
the fact that the more probable endings expressed metaphorically constituted
no serious problem for the children, (b) from the fact that correct
enactments of these metaphors were more likely to be produced given the
context and the metaphor than given the context alone, and (c) from the fact
that there was no effect of unpredictability when literal concluding
sentences were used.
These arguments do not, of course, exclude the possibility that factors
other than the predictability of the ending might account for the low level
of performance on the less probable metaphors as well as the high level of
performance on the more probable metaphors. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that such additional factors were at work. Consider first the low
level of performance on the less probable metaphors. A closer examination of
the metaphorical sentences revealed that most of the less probable metaphors
had an additional feature that may have increased their difficulty relative
to the more probable metaphors. While four of the five more probable
metaphors contained a verb which could be interpreted literally (e.g., Kenny
and Andy were puppies following their master), three of the five less
probable metaphors contained either a verb which required a metaphorical
interpretation (e.g., Sally was a bird flying to her nest), or an abstract
verb which could not easily be interpreted literally (e.g., Billy was a
squirrel heading for his tree). For the sake of brevity, we shall refer to
this difference between the verbs as a difference between literal and
nonliteral verbs. Metaphorical sentences containing a nonliteral verb might
have been more difficult to understand than ones with literal verbs because
of the need to make the additional metaphorical substitution. This
additional source of difficulty in the less probable metaphors may well have
resulted in a lower level of performance than would otherwise have been the
case.
Turning to the performance on the more probable metaphors, two things
are noteworthy. First, the absolute level of performance was high, and
second, there was no effect of age. However, it does not follow from the
fact that children at all ages were producing the same correct enactments,
that the processes they employed in doing so were the same. In fact, it
appears that the correct enactments of the more probable metaphors could have
been produced even if the children had not processed all of the concluding
sentence. In particular children might have been employing some procedure
such as the following: (a) ignore the predicate in the first part of the
sentence (e.g., "were puppies"), (b) interpret the verb (i.e., "following")
as applying literally to the actors involved (e.g., Kenny and Andy followed
someone), and (c) use contextual information and the meaning of the last noun
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phrase (i.e., "their master") to generate an action (e.g., Kenny and Andy
followed mother).
Such a "short-circuiting" procedure would only require one metaphorical
substitution, namely that of the object noun phrase. Its use would lead to
correct enactments of metaphorical sentences with literal verbs, but would
tend to result in composite, literal or incorrect enactments of the sentences
with nonliteral verbs. Given that the less probable metaphors were the ones
containing the majority of the nonliteral verbs, the observed increase in the
number of composite, literal, and incorrect enactments with the less probable
metaphors is certainly compatible with the hypothesis that particularly the
younger children used some such simplifying procedure.
Convincing evidence for the additional difficulty of the less probable
metaphors and for the use of some sort of simplifying procedure could not be
culled from the data because verb type (literal or nonliteral) and
predictability were confounded, and the design, thus, did not afford enough
degrees of freedom to explore this hypothesis with any certainty. Experiment
2 was designed specifically to address these issues.
Experiment 2
This experiment investigated the effect of the linguistic complexity of
the metaphorical input on comprehension by manipulating the verbs of the
metaphorical sentences, and it examined the interaction of this variable with
the predictability variable investigated in Experiment 1. Since the results
of Experiment 1 showed that by third grade children could deal adequately
with the most difficult of the metaphorical sentences, the present experiment
involved only preschool and first grade children.
Method
Subjects. Subjects were 16 preschool children, ranging in age from 4.1
to 5.3 years (mean age 4.8) and 16 first grade children, ranging in age from
6.5 to 7.7 years (mean age 7.2). All children attended a nursery school or
an elementary school in a rural town in Illinois. Approximately half of the
children were boys and half were girls.
Design and materials. The design was a 2 (Grade: P vs. 1) x 2 (Verb
Type: literal vs. nonliteral) x 2 (Predictability Level: more probable vs.
less probable) factorial design, with within subject measures on the last
factor. The task again involved listening to seven short stories (one
practice story and six experimental ones) and acting them out. Comprehension
was assessed on the basis of the children's enactments of the metaphors. Of
the seven stories, five were the same as those used in Experiment 1. The
same toys were used in this experiment as in the previous one. The
concluding sentences differed, first of all, with respect to verb type. Half
of the sentences used a verb which could be appropriately interpreted
literally (e.g., "Paul was a rabbit running to his hole") and half of the
sentences used a verb for which, given the context of the story, a nonliteral
interpretation would be more appropriate (e.g., "Paul was a rabbit hopping to
his hole"). Second, as in Experiment 1, the sentences differed with respect
to the likelihood of their implied outcomes. Three of these sentences
(Sentences 3, 4, and 5) represented a more likely outcome given their
contexts than did the other three (Sentences 1, 2, and 6).
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Apart from the differences already mentioned, the main design difference
between this experiment and Experiment I was that in the present experiment
there were no control groups. A literal control group was considered
unnecessary in view of the high level of performance with literal endings
found in Experiment 1. Nor was there a no-ending control group in this
experiment. Instead, each child was first asked to act out his/her own
ending to the story and was only then read the metaphorical concluding
sentence. Thus there were two tasks for each child: a completion task and a
metaphor interpretation task. The completion task allowed a within subjects
comparison of each child's enactment of his/her own ending with his/her
enactment of the metaphorical concluding sentence. In this way we were able
to know for each child what exactly was the story outcome that he/she
expected and thus to what extent the child was able to revise his/her
original hypotheses in light of the metaphor. The probability of enacting in
the completion task a story outcome that matched the outcome implied by the
metaphor was .35 for the metaphors representing the more probable outcomes,
and .08 for the metaphors representing the less probable outcomes.
Procedure. Each child was tested by two experimenters. Testing took
place in a quiet room in the child's school and lasted approximately 40
minutes. The experiment was introduced to the children as a game in which
the experimenter would read stories and the children would have to act them
out with the toys. The children were told that the game involved, first of
all, guessing each story's ending and acting it out with the available toys.
After each child had acted out an ending to a story, one of the experimenters
read the metaphorical sentence and asked the child to act it out. The
children were instructed to listen to the stories carefully and to pay
particular attention to the experimenter's endings because these endings
would "not always say exactly what happened." The children were asked to
think about the endings and act out what they thought they meant. If a child
did not respond the first time, the metaphorical sentence was read again; but
after that, the experimenter proceeded to the next story.
The six experimental stories were presented to each child in a random
order, but always preceded by the practice item. After the last story was
read, the experimenter went back to each story, reminded the child of the
story's content and of the metaphorical sentence, and asked him/her to
verbally explain and justify their enactments of these sentences.
As in Experiment 1, the children's enactments of the metaphors, as well
as the enactments of their own endings, were noted on maps that depicted the
experimental situation. Relevant comments were also noted down. Each
session was audio taped and two children in each group were video taped.
Results
The children's enactments were again examined by two judges and were
reliably classified as correct, composite, literal, or unrelated. Table 3
shows the mean proportion of enactments in each enactment category, for the
more probable and less probable metaphors with literal and nonliteral verb.
------- -
Insert Table 3 about here.
-------- ----
A 2 (Grade) x 2 (Verb Type) x 2 (Predictability Level) analysis of
variance with repeated measures on the last factor was performed on the
transformed proportions of correct responses. The analysis showed main
effects for Grade, F(1,27) = 6.36, p < .05, for Verb Type, F(1,27) = 5.89, p
< .05, and for Predictability Level, F(1,27) = 24.16, p < .001. There was
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also an interaction between Verb Type and Predictability Level, F(1,27) =
4.78, p < .05, the difference in the proportion of correct responses between
literal and nonliteral verbs being greater for the more probable story
endings than for the less probable ones.
Although errors were distributed across all three categories of
erroneous enactments (i.e., unrelated, literal, and composite), overall,
there were more composite and literal enactments with the nonliteral verbs
than with literal verbs. In fact, the decrease in the proportion of correct
enactments for nonliteral verb sentences (as compared to literal verb
sentences) can be almost all accounted for by the increase in the proportion
of literal and composite enactments (as opposed to unrelated enactments).
Since enactment type depends in part on the perceived meaning of the
verb of the metaphorical sentence, this is not a surprising finding. It
means that many of the children who recognized that the object noun phrase
should be interpreted metaphorically, and understood what its implied meaning
was, could not deal with the additional difficulty resulting from the
presence of a nonliteral verb. Also, many children who could not understand
the metaphoric meaning of the noun and who might have produced an unrelated
response when presented with metaphors containing literal verbs, were
influenced by the nonliteral verb and ended up giving literal rather than
unrelated enactments.
In order to compare performance on the metaphor interpretation task with
that on the completion task, a 2 (Grade) x 2 (Verb Type) x 2 (Predictability
Level) x 2 (Task Type) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the
last two factors was performed. For this analysis, enactments in the
completion task which matched the actions implied by the metaphors in the
interpretation task were compared to the correct enactments of those
metaphors. This ANOVA showed a main effect for Grade, F(1,27) = 6.01, Y <
.05, a main effect for Predictability Level, F(1,27) = 54.05, £ < .001, and a
main effect for Task Type, F(1,27) = 20.13, a < .001. The following
interactions were also obtained: (a) Verb Type x Predictability Level,
F(1,27) = 6.63, p < .05, (b) Verb Type x Task Type, F(1,27) = 6.99, p < .05,
and (c) Grade x Task Type, F(1,27) = 5.13, a < .05. Interactions (a) and (b)
were due to the fact that the difference between literal and nonliteral verbs
was larger for the more probable outcomes than for the less probable
outcomes, and for the metaphor interpretation than for the completion tasks.
Interaction (c) was due to the fact that the proportion of correct enactments
increased with age for the interpretation task but not for the completion
task. Figure 2 shows the mean proportion of correct enactments in the
interpretation and completion tasks for the more probable and less probable
metaphors with literal and nonliteral verbs.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
It should be mentioned here that our criterion for metaphor
comprehension was a rather conservative one. The need for the children to
first act out their preferred story ending in the completion task and then to
enact the meaning of the metaphor in the interpretation task might have made
the correct enactment of the metaphors harder in this experiment than in
Experiment 1. This is because children might have found it more difficult to
revise their enactments (Experiment 2) than their hypotheses (Experiment 1).
Discussion
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The results of this experiment show that understanding metaphorical
sentences with nonliteral verbs was indeed more difficult than understanding
metaphorical sentences with literal verbs. With respect to the influence of
the predictability variable, the findings of Experiment I were replicated:
children found it easier to enact the implied meaning of metaphorical
sentences when they represented more probable endings than when they
represented less probable endings.
The finding that literal verb sentences were easier to enact than
nonliteral verb sentences is also compatible with the use of a short-
circuiting procedure of the kind outlined in the discussion of Experiment 1.
This hypothesized procedure consisted of ignoring the predicate in the first
part of the sentence, interpreting the verb of the sentence literally, and
using contextual information and the meaning of the noun phrase to generate
the outcome of the action. If children had used such a procedure, they would
tend to produce correct enactments for literal verb sentences, but composite,
literal and incorrect enactments in the other cases. As Table 3 shows, the
mere change from a nonliteral to a literal verb in the sentences representing
the more probable story endings was enough to cause an increase in the
proportion of correct responses, from 28% to 63% in the preschoolers, and
from 54% to 84% in the first grade children. This increase replaced almost
exclusively the composite and literal responses, the proportion of incorrect
responses remaining virtually the same.
A similar increase in the proportion of correct enactments was found
when the verb of the less probable metaphorical concluding sentences was
changed from a nonliteral one to a literal one. However, because it was more
difficult to identify the referent of the object noun phrase of the metaphors
in these cases, the use of the short-circuiting procedure would have been
less productive thus giving rise to an increase in the proportion of
incorrect enactments, as observed in the data.
Overall, performance was rather poor with the less probable metaphors,
especially for the preschoolers. This suggests that the metaphors expressing
contextually less predictable events, may have put the difficulty of the
comprehension task beyond the difficulty limit for most of the children, even
for the relatively less complex (literal verb) metaphors. However, if the
difficulty of metaphor comprehension is determined by the cumulative effects
of different sources of task difficulty (predictability and complexity),
rather than by some special problem with the less probable endings, then some
other manipulation that reduces the complexity of the metaphorical sentence
might reduce the difficulty level of the comprehension task back below the
limit. The most obvious candidate for reducing the complexity of the
metaphorical sentence is the simile/metaphor manipulation. If the metaphors
are presented as similes rather than as (predicative) metaphors the fact that
they should be taken as comparisons rather than predications becomes direct
rather than indirect, or explicit rather than implicit. Experiment 3 was
conducted to investigate this possibility.
Experiment 3
It could be argued that the difference between metaphors and similes is
primarily one of explicitness. A metaphor is stated in the form of a
predicative statement but is intended to express a comparison. A simile,
however, is an explicit metaphorical comparison. Thus, although they differ
25 Metaphor Difficulty
28 Metaphor Difficulty
with respect to their explicitness, similes and metaphors both involve
nonliteral similarity (Ortony, 1979). For this reason we shall refer to
similes as metaphorical sentences.
The knowledge that predicative statements can sometimes be intended
nonliterally (as is the case with metaphors), is part of an adult's knowledge
of how language is used. However, the ability to understand nonliteral
similarity does not necessarily depend on any linguistic knowledge of that
sort. It is thus possible that some of the difficulties young children have
with metaphors might arise not from their inability to understand nonliteral
similarity, but from their failure to interpret the predicative statement as
an implicit comparison. If this is so, children should find similes easier
to understand than metaphors, a hypothesis that has been confirmed with older
children (e.g., Reynolds & Ortony, 1980).
Method
Subjects. Subjects were 16 preschool children, ranging in age from 4.0
to 5.3 years (mean age 4.8) and 16 first grade children, ranging in age from
6.8 to 7.8 years (mean age 7.0). The children attended the same elementary
school and nursery school as the children in the previous experiment.
Approximately half of them were girls and half were boys.
Design, materials, and procedure. The design for this study was a 2
(Grade) x 2 (Verb Type) x 2 (Predictability Level) factorial design, with
repeated measures on the last factor. Again, each child participated in two
tasks, a completion task and an interpretation task. The same stories and
toys were used as in Experiment 2. The only difference between the two
experiments was that all metaphors were replaced by their corresponding
similes. For example, "Paul was a rabbit running to his hole," was replaced
with "Paul was like a rabbit running to his hole." Again the sentences
differed with respect to verb type (i.e., "Paul was like a rabbit running to
his hole" vs. "Paul was like a rabbit hopping to his hole"), and with respect
to the likelihood of their implied outcomes. The same procedure was followed
as in Experiment 2.
Results
The children's enactments were again grouped into four categories by two
judges. Table 4 shows the mean proportion of enactments in each category
type for the similes that represented more probable and less probable story
endings with literal and nonliteral verbs.
Insert Table 4 about here.
Evidently, both the preschool and the first grade children found the
similes easier to enact than the metaphors. The mean proportion of correct
enactments of the similes in this experiment was much larger than it was for
the metaphors in Experiment 2, for each of the categories of metaphorical
expressions used. In addition, as in Experiment 2, the proportion of literal
and composite enactments was greater with nonliteral verbs than with literal
verbs.
A 2 (Grade) x 2 (Verb Type) x 2 (Predictability Level) analysis of
variance with repeated measures on the last factor was performed on the
transformed proportions of correct enactments. Main effects were obtained
for Verb Type, F(1,27) = 13.59, p < .001, for Predictability Level, F(1,27) =
14.94, p < .001, and for Grade, F(1,27) = 5.16, p < .05. An interaction was
also obtained between Grade, Verb Type and Predictability Level, F(1,27) =
4.62, p < .05. This was due to the fact that the first graders had a larger
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number of correct enactments than the preschoolers when the similes (a)
contained a nonliteral verb and represented less probable story endings and
(b) when they contained a literal verb and represented a more probable
ending, than in all other cases.
Again, in order to compare the children's performance on the two tasks,
a 2 (Grade) x 2 (Verb Type) x 2 (Predictability Level) x 2 (Task Type)
analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last two factors was
performed on the enactments of both tasks that agreed with the implied
meaning of the metaphorical sentences. The analysis of variance revealed
main effects for Verb Type, F(1,27) = 11.93, p < .01, Predictability Level,
F(1,27) = 39.38, p < .001, and Task Type, F(1,27) = 41.97, < .001. There
was also an interaction between Verb Type and Task Type, F(1,27) = 8.34, p <
.01. Figure 3 shows the mean proportion of correct enactments for the two
tasks in the various conditions.
---------------------------
Insert Figure 3 about here.
-------- -------------
Discussion
As can be seen in Figure 3, if the completion task is considered to
provide a baseline, the preschool children were generally able to enact the
implied meaning of all the types of similes, except those that included both
a nonliteral verb and represented a less probable story ending. Using the
same criterion, first grade children showed evidence of some understanding in
all conditions.
While the insertion of "like" clearly helped the children to enact the
meaning of the metaphorical sentences, it did not always lead to correct
paraphrases. Indeed, it appears that "like" was interpreted by the children
in one of two ways. One way was to interpret "like" as "looks like" or "acts
like," focusing either on the perceptual similarity between the objects
compared, or on the similarity of the actions in which the two agents engage
(e.g., how does Billy look like a squirrel, how does Billy act like a
.squirrel). Most of the children who gave literal or composite enactments
interpreted like to mean "acting like" in the literal sense (e.g., "Billy
acted like a squirrel by getting down on his four legs and burying the nuts
or the cookies," "Sally flew like a bird by running fast and moving her hands
up and down," "Paul hopped and moved his ears like a rabbit," etc.)
The second interpretation of "like" involved focusing on the relational
similarity "the way A did B was like the way C did D." For example, one
child explained that "the way Sally ran to her mom was like the way a bird
flies to its nest." Some of the children who gave correct enactments of the
similes were also able to provide quite abstract relational interpretations
of them, but this was rare. In most cases the first grade children could
only justify their metaphorical substitutions of the objects of the
metaphorical sentences. Thus, although the replacement of a metaphor by its
equivalent simile leads to a new problem, namely that of how the word "like"
will be interpreted, it nevertheless appears that it increases the
probability of correct enactments.
General Discussion
Taken together, the results of the three experiments suggest that
metaphor comprehension is a progressive development which -starts quite early
and during which children become better able to perform successively more
difficult metaphor comprehension tasks. In this respect, our findings are
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similar to those of many other studies which have shown that under certain
circumstances evidence can be found for an early emergence of many cognitive
skills (see Gelman, 1978).
It is interesting to consider the results of these experiments in terms
of the difficulty limit discussed in the Introduction. To do this, suppose
that each of the manipulated variables contributes an additional source of
difficulty to the comprehension task when this variable is set at a more
difficult level. In other words, less probable metaphors involve an
additional source of difficulty relative to the more probable metaphors,
metaphorical sentences with nonliteral verbs involve an additional source of
difficulty relative to metaphorical sentences with literal verbs, and
metaphors involve an additional source of difficulty relative to similes. We
are assuming that each source of difficulty increases the overall difficulty
of the metaphor comprehension task by at least one theoretically
distinguishable step. Although increases in the number of these steps are
assumed to be associated with increased and/or more complex processing
requirements, these steps are only assumed here to be theoretically
identifiable. There is certainly no reason to postulate that each step
corresponds to a unique psychological process. The way in which such steps,
identifiable in theory, correspond to psychological processes is a question
for further research.
---------------------------
Insert Figure 4 about here.
---------------------------
Figure 4 summarizes the results from Experiments 2 and 3, conceptualized
in this way. The mean proportion of correct enactments is shown separately
for the metaphors representing the more probable and less probable endings.
The metaphorical sentences have been assigned to one of three levels of
difficulty. The simplest level of difficulty, level 1, represents the
similes with literal verbs. Difficulty level 2 represents the similes with
nonliteral verbs, and the metaphors with literal verbs. In both of these
conditions an additional source of difficulty is present relative to the
metaphorical sentences at difficulty level 1. In the case of nonliteral
verbs the additional source results from the need to determine the
nonliteral verb's implied action, while in the case of the metaphor it
results from the need to interpret the predicative statement as requiring an
implicit comparison. Finally, difficulty level 3 represents the metaphors
with nonliteral verbs. This condition introduces one more source of
difficulty than in level 2: the implied meaning of the nonliteral verb must
be determined, and the predicative statement must be recognized and
interpreted as a comparative structure.
Figure 4 shows that both the predictability and the complexity variables
are important contributors to metaphor comprehension difficulty. Looking at
predictability first, it is apparent that the proportion of correct
enactments decreases from more probable endings to less probable endings.
This decrease in performance corresponds to the main effect for the
predictability variable which is found in all three experiments. The
proportion of correct enactments also drops as additional levels are added
to the complexity variable. This trend occurs with both the more probable
and the less probable endings, but is more evident in the case of the
preschoolers than in the case of the first graders. Thus, the complexity of
the linguistic input is also an important variable in metaphor comprehension.
However, the performance of the children in the enactment tasks cannot be
explained in terms of either the predictability variable or the complexity
explained in terms of either the predictability variable or the complexity
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variables alone. Rather, complexity interacts with predictability to produce
a more complicated picture. As Figure 4 shows, preschool children generally
failed to correctly enact less probable metaphorical outcomes for items
beyond difficulty level 1, while they performed quite well with more probable
metaphorical outcomes up to difficulty level 2. Similarly, the first grade
children could barely manage two levels of difficulty when enacting less
probable endings, but performed quite well at all levels of difficulty when
enacting more probable endings. All children appeared able, in principle, to
engage in the additional processing requirements of metaphorical sentences
representing less probable endings, but they did so at the expense of the
complexity variable.
What seems to matter, particularly for the younger children, is the
total difficulty of the comprehension task in terms of various sources of
difficulty, rather than some particular source, or combination of those
sources. Not surprisingly, the degree of difficulty of the comprehension
task that children can tolerate appears to increase with age. This would be
expected if one assumes that as they become older, children are better able
to process more information at the same time and/or that they are able to
engage in qualitatively different processes.
Thus, in general, the findings are consistent with the view outlined in
the introduction that the difficulty of a comprehension task depends both on
the complexity of the linguistic input itself and on the predictability of
its derived meaning. The present experiments suggest that children use the
linguistic and situational context to draw inferences about what kind of
linguistic input might come next. When these inferences are consistent with
the meaning they derive for the linguistic input, comprehension is
facilitated. When they are not, comprehension is hindered. In the latter
case, understanding the metaphorical expression involves revising hypotheses
about the meaning of the linguistic input. This hypothesis revision requires
additional processing and thus increases the difficulty of the comprehension
task. The results suggest that even preschool children can revise their
original hypotheses, but only when the complexity of the linguistic input is
low. In a similar way, while increased complexity alone is not enough to
cause comprehension failure, the combination of complexity with hypothesis
revision is. Overall, there appears to be an interesting trade off between
predictability and complexity, such that increasing the difficulty of one
sets limits on how difficult the other can be before comprehension fails.
Although the present experiments indicate that even preschool children
have some understanding of metaphorical uses of language, it must be pointed
out that there was some evidence that this understanding might be less
complete than that of an adult. In particular, the analysis of the kinds of
errors made with nonliteral verbs in Experiment 2 suggests that some of the
children may have been "short-circuiting" the metaphor by ignoring the
predicate ("Billy was a squirrel burying the nuts"). Nevertheless, even if
children were doing this, the resulting task still required some
understanding of metaphorical language. Such short-circuiting may have
simplified the sentences, but it did not eliminate all of their metaphorical
elements.
Our findings have some interesting implications for a developmental
theory of metaphor comprehension. Regardless of how rudimentary the
preschoolers' understanding of metaphor is, the fact that there are some
conditions under which they can understand metaphorical language is
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inconsistent with efforts to relate metaphoric understanding to Piagetian
theory, and especially to the claim that formal, or at least late concrete
operational thinking is a necessary prerequisite for metaphor comprehension
(Billow, 1975; Cometa & Eson, 1978; Elkind, 1970). It might be objected here
that some of the preschool children were already performing at a concrete
operational stage and that these were the children who enacted the
metaphorical sentences correctly, the remaining ones failing. This argument
cannot, however, account for the fact that the data were very homogeneous,
with most of the preschoolers correctly enacting the metaphorical sentences
when the difficulty of the comprehension task was low, but failing to do so
as the difficulty of the comprehension task increased. The Piagetian
position as commonly interpreted by investigators of metaphor is incapable of
explaining both the high performance of most of the preschoolers in some of
the tasks, and the observed decline in this performance as the complexity of
the metaphoric input increases or its relation to the linguistic context
becomes less predictable.
Although the present experiments contradict claims that concrete
operations are a necessary prerequisite for metaphor comprehension, they do
not necessarily invalidate the notion that the young child's classification
abilities are related to metaphor comprehension. However, together with
other research that has challenged many of Piaget's claims about the
emergence and development of the young child's classification skills, (e.g.,
Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Jonhson & Boyes-Braem, 1976; Markman & Siebert, 1976;
Mandler, 1982), they do show that the Piagetian position, at least as it is
usually interpreted, provides a limited perspective from which to view the
development of metaphoric understanding and the nature of the cognitive
mechanisms that underlie it (see also, Vosniadou & Ortony, 1983).
Our findings are also inconsistent with the position that the
development of metaphoric understanding follows a clearly identifiable
sequence of stages, which starts with literal responses first, and only later
follows with more mature types of metaphoric understanding (e.g., Asch &
Nerlove, 1960; Winner et al., 1976; Demorest, Silberstein, Gardner & Winner,
Note 1). Very few children in our experiments adopted only literal
interpretations of the metaphorical expressions, suggesting that they are not
bound to one particular way of interpreting metaphorical language. On the
contrary, as revealed in this study, children's metaphoric thinking seems to
be more flexible than generally believed.
It might be argued that literal enactments of the metaphors were
unlikely in these studies because materials necessary for such enactments
(e.g., a toy squirrel and toy nuts) were not provided. While we agree that
the provision of such materials would have increased the number of literal
enactments, we believe that it would have decreased the ecological validity
of the task. It is unusual for the literal referents of terms used
metaphorically in ordinary communicative situations to be present in those
situations. It would be confusing, if, speaking figuratively, one were to
announce while in sight of a bridge, "We'll cross that bridge when we come to
it." Our concern in this research was with the comprehension of metaphors,
not with the comprehension of puns, or the recognition of humor!
The arguments against the notion of a literal stage as a necessary
prerequisite to nonliteral interpretations of metaphors are not meant to
belittle the fact that there is a tendency in young children, which decreases
with age, to opt for a literal interpretation of the metaphor when its
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correct meaning is elusive. In our experiments, these literal
interpretations were justified on the grounds that they represented a
pretend-play situation. Considering the amount of time a 4-year-old spends
in pretend play, this interpretation of the metaphors must seem very natural
to them, despite its inappropriateness as far as the general story context is
concerned. Thus, while symbolic play has been thought of as a precursor to
metaphor (Verbrugge, 1979; Winner et al., 1980)--which might very well be the
case--we also see that the naturalness of pretend games might stand in the
way of more mature metaphorical thinking in the young child.
One question that this study leaves unanswered centers around children's
difficulty in correctly enacting metaphors involving nonliteral verbs. Is it
simply that children find it hard to make the additional metaphoric
substitutions, or are verbs more difficult to understand than nouns when used
metaphorically? It has been argued that relational similarity is harder to
understand than descriptive similarity (see Billow, 1975; Gentner, Note 2).
However, even the simplest metaphorical expressions used in our experiments
involved an implicit comparison of two objects (nest/house, repair
shop/hospital, nuts/cookies) whose shared similarity was not of a
physical/perceptual nature but of a relational nature. Thus, the success of
the preschoolers in the present experiments, even with those metaphors and
similes that involved only metaphorical nouns, shows a more sophisticated
understanding of similarity and a higher level of metaphoric competence than
that shown by other studies (e.g., Billow, 1975; Malgady, 1977; Vosniadou &
Ortony, 1983), where the metaphors compared objects for which the primary
basis of similarity was perceptual.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that in these experiments the
manipulation of "predictability" was rather heavy-handed. For the purposes
of the present experiments this manipulation was adequate, since its main
purpose was to show that contextual predictability is an important variable
in metaphor comprehension. A more careful examination of the contribution of
context to the comprehension of metaphors would require a more thorough
conceptual analysis of the notion of predictability.
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Table 1
Metaphorical Concluding Sentences
More probable
1. Billy was a squirrel burying the nuts.
2. Mary was a car being taken to the repair shop.
3. Kenny and Andy were puppies following their master.
4. Sally was a tiger walking towards the jungle.
5. Jack was a child being sent to his room.
6. Paul was a horse heading for his barn.
Less orobable
1. Billy was a squirrel heading for his tree.
2. Mary was a pony being taken to the stable.
3. Kenny and Andy were puppies barking at their master.
4. Sally was a bird flying to her nest.
5. Jack was garbage being thrown in the trash.
6. Paul was a rabbit heading for the wolf.
Literal Concluding Sentences
More probable
1. Billy was a child hiding the cookies.
2. Mary was a girl being taken to the hospital.
3. Kenny and Andy were children following their mother.
4. Sally was a girl walking towards the school.
5. Jack was an elephant being sent to his cage.
6. Paul was a boy running home.
Less probable
1. Billy was a boy running to his room.
2. Mary was a girl being taken home.
3. Kenny and Andy were children yelling at their mother.
4. Sally was a girl going to her car.
5. Jack was an elephant being thrown out of the circus.
6. Paul was a child fighting the bad boy.
Table 2
Mean Proportion of Enactments in the four Enactment Categories
of the Metaphorical Concluding Sentences
Enactment Categories
Grade
Unrelated Literal Composite Correct
More probable ending
Preschool .07 .03 .05 .85
Ist .0 .05 .05 .90
3rd .0 .0 .07 .93
Less probable ending
Preschool .45 .25 .07 .23
Ist .20 .17 .18 .45
3rd .17 .0 .15 .68
Table 3
Mean Proportion of Enactments in the Four Enactment Categories for the
More Probable and Less Probable Metaphors with Literal and Nonliteral Verb
Nonliteral Verb Literal Verb
Grade More probable Metaphors More probable Metaphors
Unrelated Li teral Composite Correct Unrelated Literal Composite Correct
Preschool .28 .23 .19 .28 .25 .12 .00 .63
1st .04 .12 .30 .54 .04 .00 .12 .84
Less probable Metaphors Less probable MetaphorsGrade
Unrelated Li teral Composite Correct Unrelated Literal Compos i te Correct
Preschool .10 .52 .33 .05 .30 .46 .12 .12
1st. .17 .29 .29 .25 .17 .29 .21 .33
Table 4
Mean Proportion of Enactments in the Four Enactment Categories
for Similes with Literal and Nonliteral Verb
Nonliteral Verb Literal Verb
Grade More probable Similes More probable Similes
Unrelated Literal Composite Correct Unrelated Literal Composite Correct
Preschool .09 .05 .29 .57 .12 .12 .00 .76
Ist .17 .00 .25 .58 .00 .00 .00 1.00
Less probable Similes Less probable Similes
Grade
Unrelated Literal Composite Correct Unrelated Literal Composite Correct
Preschool .14 .43 .38 .05 .21 .17 .00 .62
1st .17 .08 .33 .42 .17 .17 .04 .62
Figure Captions
Figure 1. Photograph of materials.
Figure 2. Mean proportion of correct enactments for the Experimental
and No-ending Control Groups.
Figure 3. Mean proportion of correct enactments for the Interpreta-
tion and Completion tasks in Experiment 2.
Figure 4. Mean proportion of correct enactments for the Interpreta-
tion and Completion tasks in Experiment 3.
Figure 5. Mean proportion of correct enactments for the metaphorical
sentences.
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